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Winners and Losers in the Communications Sector: 
An Examination of Digital Television Regulation in 
the United Kingdom  
Eliza Varney∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Commercial pressures have weakened the adoption of 
regulatory measures designed to safeguard the interests of the 
public in the communications sector.  Regulators have been 
drawn into leaving aside the protection of citizenship interests 
and adopting a perception of the public exclusively as economic 
actors.  In the absence of “heightened public interest 
requirements,”1 the safeguarding of citizenship-related 
concerns is nothing more than an ongoing Sisyphean struggle.  
Any attempt to protect these interests is rolling into the “abyss 
of unbridled commercialism.”2 
Professor Anthony Varona has asserted that the United 
States is witnessing an “increased commodification of viewers”3 
in a legal context in which the market players seem to set the 
rules of the game.  This article assesses the extent to which a 
similar phenomenon is taking place within the context of the 
United Kingdom.  I will focus on the regulation of digital 
television (DTV) infrastructure.  I intend to demonstrate that 
the concerns identified by Professor Varona in relation to 
                                                 
 ∗ Lecturer in Law, University of Keele Law School, Staffordshire, 
United Kingdom.  This article is based on a paper presented at the ITS 
Europe, 15th Biennial Conference: "Changing Peoples, Societies and 
Companies: Telecommunications in the 21st Century", Berlin, Germany, 
September 4-7, 2004.  I would like to thank Mike Feintuck and Mike Varney 
for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this article. Any errors and 
omissions are, of course, my own. 
 1. Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The 
Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 91 (2004). 
 2. Mike Feintuck, Walking the High-Wire: The UK’s Draft 
Communications Bill, 9 EUR. PUB. L. 105, 122 (2003). 
 3. Varona, supra note 1, at 66. 
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programming permeate the entire DTV supply chain.  
Regulation of DTV infrastructure involves both an economic 
and a public policy dimension, and protection of citizenship 
interests should not be limited to content-related issues.  In 
fact, ensuring digital broadcasters’ access to DTV’s 
infrastructure is instrumental in ensuring public access to 
information.4 
This article focuses on the United Kingdom’s 
Communications Act of 2003.5  Part I concentrates on 
noneconomic aspects the United Kingdom’s regulation of DTV 
infrastructure, particularly tools for protecting citizenship 
concerns associated with the communications sector.  Part II is 
concerned with the extent to which the Act protects consumer-
related interest implicit in the economic aspects of DTV 
infrastructure.  This part refers mainly to technical and 
competition-related concerns, placing particular emphasis on 
the issue of interoperability and access to bottlenecks.6  This 
article concludes that although the Act responds to the 
technical aspects of DTV infrastructure, it has failed to 
adequately address public policy concerns within the 
communications sector.  In a fashion similar to Professor 
Varona’s criticism of American communications law, I attribute 
this deplorable status quo to the influence exercised by market 
                                                 
 4. Christopher T. Marsden, for example, notes that three factors are 
necessary in order to ensure pluralism and diversity in the media sector: 
ownership rules to guarantee a diversity of market players, the “reinvention of 
public service broadcasting” to ensure the public has access to information and 
access to bottlenecks.  Christopher T. Marsden, Pluralism in the Multi-
Channel Market, Suggestions for Regulatory Scrutiny, 4 INT’L. J. COMM. L. & 
POL’Y. 1, 14-15 (2000). 
 5. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/20030021.htm (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2005).  The Communications Act implements the 2002 Directives on 
electronic communications in the United Kingdom.  Among the major changes 
in the regulation of electronic communications is the removal of the 
requirement of individual licensing of telecommunication systems.  This 
article is concerned with interoperability and access-related aspects in the 
regulation of bottlenecks in digital television.  For an analysis of the new 
framework, see generally John Cassels, Communications Bill – The Vital 
Facts, 12 UTIL. L. REV. 90 (2001); Marly Didizian & Vanessa Shield, The 
Communications Bill – Completing the Picture, 8 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. 
REV. 167 (2002); Feintuck, supra note 2; Graeme Maguire & Jason Romer, An 
Overview of the Draft United Kingdom Communications Bill, 8 COMPUTER & 
TELECOMM. L. REV. 136 (2002). 
 6. Bottlenecks are points of strategic control in the DTV supply chain.  
See generally Dermot Nolan, Bottlenecks in Pay Television, Impact on Market 
Developments in Europe, 21 TELECOMM. POL’Y. 597 (1997). 
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players over regulators.  This article emphasizes the need for 
regulation based on a clear notion of the “public interest,” 
incorporating not only economic but also social interests. 
I.  SHAKY GROUND FOR PROTECTING CITIZENSHIP 
INTERESTS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR? 
 The Communications Act failed to adequately address the 
public policy implications of bottlenecks.7  The bottlenecks 
debate cannot be limited to purely economic matters.  The 
debate also involves a range of noneconomic citizenship-related 
interests in pluralism and diversity in the communications 
market.  In his analysis of American law, Professor Varona has 
argued that “[o]ver the last twenty-five years, the FCC has 
repealed almost all of its substantive public interest 
regulations, relying instead on marketplace forces in the 
individual television markets . . . to guide broadcasters’ 
decisions concerning the nature and content of all of their 
programming.”8  Regulation of infrastructure has followed a 
similar path.  Rather than balancing the public’s noneconomic 
interests with market-related concerns, regulators have 
fraternized with commercial players and minimized legal 
references to “the public interest” in the communications 
sector.9  On both sides of the Atlantic, market-oriented policies 
                                                 
 7. For further reference to the “public policy” implications of the 
bottlenecks challenge, see Nikos Nikolinakos, The New Legal Framework for 
Digital Gateways: The Complementary Nature of Competition Law and Sector 
Specific Regulation, 21 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 408, 408 (2000). 
[M]arket players who control the bottlenecks in question will have the 
commercial incentive to extend their power to the provision of 
content.  This can be done, for instance, when gatekeepers block or 
limit consumer access via their set-top boxes to certain programme 
services.  Therefore, the bottleneck issue must be tackled not only 
because of its anti-competitive effects but also because of certain 
public policy priorities, for instance the preservation of pluralism. 
Id. at 408.  
 8. Varona, supra note 1, at 5. 
 9. The term “public interest” implies opposition to private interests.  In 
his interpretation of the “public interest,” Harm Schepel refers to the 
definition advanced in Librandi v. Cuttica, 1998 ECR I – 5955: “the interests 
of the collectivity had to prevail over the private interests of individual 
operators.”  Harm Schepel, Delegation of Regulatory Powers to Private Parties 
Under EC Competition Law: Towards a Procedural Public Interest Test, 39 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 31, 49 (2002).  Schepel emphasizes that “[t]he 
appropriate distinction is between decisions taken in the advancement of the 
collective good and decisions taken in the pursuit of narrow private interests.”  
Id.  See generally MIKE FEINTUCK, MEDIA REGULATION, PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
THE LAW (1999).   
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have become the norm and have undermined the legal 
protection of citizenship interests. 
Within the United Kingdom, the Draft Communications 
Bill developed a “light touch” regulatory approach,10 based on 
the view that regulatory intervention should occur only if 
needed.11  The Joint Committee on the Draft Communications 
Bill criticized this approach: 
We support the duty on OFCOM [the Office of Communications] to 
have regard to the principles that regulatory activities should be 
‘“proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which action 
is needed.’”  We recommend that these principles, rather than an 
undefined commitment to ‘“light touch’” regulation, should govern the 
provisions of the final Bill regarding regulatory burdens.12 
Although the Communications Act omitted the reference to 
“light touch” regulation,13 it maintained the trend toward 
reducing regulatory intervention.14  According to the Act, 
                                                 
 10. Dep’t of Trade and Indus., 2002 Draft Communications Bill, cl. 
5(1)(a)(b), available at http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk/pdf/ 
clauses_part1.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).  “Duties to secure light touch 
regulation: (1) OFCOM shall keep the carrying out of their functions under 
review with a view to securing that regulation by OFCOM does not involve (a) 
the imposition of burdens which are unnecessary; or (b) the maintenance of 
burdens which have become unnecessary.”  
 11. Id. cl. 3(2)(a). 
 12. Report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Bill, 
Session 2001-02, HL Paper 169-1, HC 876-1, 23-24 [hereinafter Puttnam 
Report];  see also Feintuck, supra note 2, at 118 (“The Puttnam Report 
identifies the obligation to engage in ‘light touch’ regulation as a potential 
obstacle to Ofcom’s effective operation—a term which might be thrown back in 
Ofcom’s face on any occasion when it attempts tough or firm regulatory 
intervention.”).  The Communications Act establishes OFCOM as the single 
regulator for the communications sector.  OFCOM unites the functions of the 
Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), Independent Television Commission 
(ITC), Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), Radio Communications 
Agency, and Radio Authority.  For the transfer of jurisdictions to the new 
regulator, see The Office of Communications Act 2002 (Commencement No. 3) 
and Communications Act 2003 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2003, (2003) SI 
3142 (C. 125), available at 
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2003/20033142.htm. See generally 
Stuart Weinstein, OFCOM, Information Convergence and the Never Ending 
Drizzle of Electric Rain, 8 INT’L  J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (2004). 
 13. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 6 (Eng.) (referring to the 
“duties to review regulatory burdens”). 
 14. References to “light touch” regulation may have been eliminated from 
the Communications Act, but not from the language of regulators and of the 
Government.  Lord Currie, for example, referred to “light touch” in relation to 
the functions of OFCOM in his speech to the Guardian Media Lecture:  “we 
will seek to regulate only where regulation is necessary, and will then look for 
the least intrusive method possible to achieve our policy goals and public 
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“OFCOM must have regard, in all cases, to . . . the principles 
under which regulatory activities should be transparent, 
accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at 
cases in which action is needed.”15  Similarly, under European 
Union law, OFCOM bears a duty to “encourage . . . the 
provision of network access and service interoperability.”16  The 
choice of the term “encourage” rather than “ensure,” places 
more weight on the will of the market players rather than on 
the regulators.  It advances the tendency toward “light touch” 
rather than active regulatory intervention for bottlenecks in 
digital television.  A similar approach has been adopted in the 
2002 European Union Directives.17  The Communications Act 
reflects the regulatory attitude advanced at the European level. 
The Communications Act is intended as a deregulatory 
instrument.  The new measure “has proposed a far more 
deregulatory and liberalising regime than” many observers had 
expected.18  “[O]verall, the buzz word for this brave new world 
is ‘deregulation.’  To its advocates, less regulation will permit 
the creation of British media giants capable of competing on a 
world stage . . . .”19  This deregulatory posture, however,  
sacrifices the interest of the public, which can be adequately 
protected only by active regulatory intervention.20  The recent 
                                                 
duties.”  OFCOM Chairman David Currie, Speech to the Radio Festival of the 
Guardian Media Lecture (Jul. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Currie Speech], available 
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media-office/speeches_presentations (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2005). 
 15. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(3)(a) (Eng.). 
 16. Id. § 4(7). 
 17. See Council Directive 2002/19/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter 
Access Directive], available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/ l_10820020424en00070020.pdf; Council Directive 
2002/20/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Authorisation Directive], available 
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/ 
2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00210032.pdf; Council Directive 2002/21/EC, 
2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Framework Directive], available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/ 
dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00330050.pdf; Council Directive 2002/22/EC, 
2002 O.J. (L 108) [hereinafter Universal Service Directive], available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/ 
l_10820020424en00510077.pdf.  
 18. Maguire & Rower, supra note 5, at 140. 
 19. Thomas Crane & Rico Calleja, The Communications Bill – New Dawn 
or False Dawn?, 7 COMM. L. 116, 116 (2002). 
 20. See Owen Gibson, Peer Joins Communications Bill Protest, THE 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 3, 2002 (expressing some peers’ concern that the bill would 
fail to protect the public against commercial interests), available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4550456-107065,00.html. 
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measures at both the European and domestic level retreat from 
active regulatory intervention, favoring the application of 
general competition law.  Comments on the 2002 Directives 
emphasize: 
A key principle underpinning the proposals is the need to move away 
from sector-specific ex-ante regulation towards greater reliance on the 
use of competition law in the communications sector.  This can be 
seen as an attempt by the Commission to use competition law as a 
tool to address perceived weaknesses in the individual ex-ante 
regulatory regimes of the Member States.21 
Similarly, OFCOM’s requirement of promoting competition 
is perceived as part of the “duties for the purpose of fulfilling 
community obligations.”22  OFCOM will have concurrent 
powers with the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) in competition-
related matters for the communications sector.23  Graeme 
Maguire and Jason Rower identify the Government’s intention 
that these matters will be exercised primarily by the 
communications regulator: 
The shift that is likely to result is that broadcasting competition 
issues, generally dealt with by the OFT at present will, in the future, 
fall within OFCOM’s ambit.  The Government also expects that as 
sector specific regulation is rolled back, so OFCOM will be able to rely 
increasingly on general competition powers as opposed to sector-
specific regulations.24 
Lord Currie links the notion of “light touch” regulation 
with the prospect if the withdrawal of regulatory intervention 
in competitive markets.25  Nevertheless, regulation must not be 
perceived as temporary, until the market is competitive.26  In 
                                                 
 21. Theresa Gourlay & Julia Hemmings, Proposed Directives on Access 
and Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 7 
COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 199, 200 (2001). 
 22. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(3) (Eng.). 
 23. Maguire & Romer, supra note 5, at 138. 
 24. Id.  
 25. “Staying with the notion of ‘light touch’ for a moment, we intend that 
in due course the development of competition will mean that there will be 
areas of regulation from which we can withdraw altogether.”  Currie Speech, 
supra note 14. 
 26. A similar debate was advanced in relation to private utilities in that 
regulation is “a matter of ‘holding the fort’ until competition arrives.”  COSMO 
GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITIES: A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 152 
(Hart Pub’g, 2000).  Referring to the 1983 Littlechild Report, Graham argued 
that “the Report assumes that regulation is a temporary phenomenon and that 
competition will develop speedily so that regulation is no longer needed.”  Id. 
at 151.  Graham wrote that, in fact, the arrival of competition did not mean 
that regulation withered away.  “What we can see is an increasing emphasis 
on issues of competition policy and consumer protection, and a concern with 
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Cosmo Graham’s terms, “the regulators will have responsibility 
for ensuring that companies meet their social obligations, 
which may be defined in a variety of different ways . . . .  So, 
overall, although the form and instruments of regulation are 
changing, the activity is not likely to wither away.”27 
An effective approach for controlling the communications 
sector must comprise both competition and sector-specific 
regulation.28  Competition authorities perceive the public 
exclusively as consumers, balancing their interests with the 
interest of market players.  On the other hand, an active 
regulatory approach favors the perception of the public not just 
as economic actors, but also as citizens.  Furthermore, this 
approach comes alongside the need to emphasize the interest of 
the public over commercial interests. 
Initially, the Draft Bill advanced a set of regulatory 
objectives that ignored the public’s noneconomic interests.29  
This was also reflected in the access and interoperability 
                                                 
their inter-relationship.”  Id. at 189. 
 27. Id. at 194.  “[I]t would thus seem clear that regulation will have a 
considerable place in the new media environment; arguments that it will 
wither away are based on grossly simplistic assumptions as to the reasons for 
regulation and an over-optimism as to the likely openness of future market 
structures.”  David Goldberg et al., Conclusions, in REGULATING THE 
CHANGING MEDIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 307 (David Goldberg et al. eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 28. Regulation must be maintained in order to safeguard the interest of 
citizens and consumers:   
There is a clear role for ex ante sector specific regulation which can 
establish regulatory outcomes that are certain as industry players 
invest in new services and technologies. . . . [I]n such a rapidly 
developing sector, in some cases anti-competitive positions could 
become entrenched before ex post competition regulation has 
addressed the issues fully. 
BRITISH BROAD. CORP., RESPONSE TO EU CONVERGENCE WORKING DOCUMENT 
(SEC (98) 1284), DETAILED RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS § 1.27 (Nov. 1998) 
[hereinafter BBC’S RESPONSE], available at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/workdoc/bbc.html.  Similarly, Lord 
Puttnam argues that “[w]e must . . . dispel the current fantasy that should 
unacceptable levels of ownership emerge, regulators can move swiftly to put 
the genie back in the bottle.”  648 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1432 (daily ed. 
June 5, 2003) (statement of Lord Puttnam) [hereinafter Puttnam Statement], 
available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds03/ 
text/3060501.htm; see also Andrew Murray & Colin Scott, Controlling the New 
Media: Hybrid Responses to New Forms of Power, 65 MOD. L. REV. 491 (2002). 
 29. One of OFCOM’s objectives is “to further the interests of the persons 
who are customers for the services and facilities in relation to which OFCOM 
have functions.”  2002 Draft Communications Bill, supra note 10, cl. 3(1)(a). 
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provisions.  Clause 4(8) gave priority to competition concerns, 
and treated consumer-related interests as afterthoughts.30  The 
Draft Bill, as well as the 2002 Directives,31 did not place 
sufficient emphasis on the noneconomic “public policy” 
dimension of regulating bottlenecks in digital television. 
The Puttnam Report, which contains the recommendations 
of the Joint Committee of the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons for the scrutiny of the Draft Bill, has criticized the 
Communication Act’s failure to give sufficient emphasis to the 
noneconomic interests.  The report condemns failure to 
prioritize the interests of consumers in relation to the functions 
of OFCOM.  “There is no indication in the Directive or the 
Draft Bill of priority between the five requirements, which 
relate to the promotion of competition, the development of the 
internal market and the promotion of the interests of citizens . . 
. .”32  While welcoming the suggestion of the Joint Committee, 
the Government insisted that “the duties properly reflect the 
breadth of all OFCOM’s responsibilities, both economic and 
cultural, and follow the proposition set out in the White Paper 
that each duty is of equal weight.”33 
Section 3 of the Communications Act, however, states that 
“[i]t shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in carrying out its 
                                                 
 30. Similarly, the conditions advanced in clause 41(5) of the Bill are 
designed to “ensur[e] a level of network access and interoperability that will 
promote efficiency, sustainable competition and benefit to consumers.”  See 
Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 45. 
 31. The actual provisions of the Bill need to be contrasted with the 
Government’s comments on these measures.  “In all of these changes, the 
interests of citizens come first, whether as consumers, as viewers and 
listeners, or as participants in democracy.”  Press Notice, U.K. Department of 
Trade & Indus. & Dep’t for Culture, Media & Sport (DTI–DCMS), Draft Bill 
Overhauls Legal Framework for Communications Industry (May 7, 2002), 
available at http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk/press_notices.html. 
 32. Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 9-10.  Similarly, in relation to the 
privatized utilities, Graham notes that “[t]he legislation does not . . . provide 
guidance in prioritising the various interests . . . . The regulators have tended 
to place most emphasis on their economic duties, in particular, the duty to 
promote competition, arguing that this is in the consumers’ long term 
interests.”  GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 32.  He adds that “it would be equally 
tenable to see even in the existing legislation as requiring a balanced approach 
to the issues of economic and social obligations.”  Id. 
 33. DEP’T OF TRADE AND INDUS. & DEP’T OF CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE 
DRAFT COMMUNICATIONS BILL, 2002, Cm 5646, at 3, available at 
http://www.communicationsbill.gov.uk.  The Bill identifies OFCOM’s duty: “to 
further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition.”  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(1)(b) (Eng.). 
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functions, to promote the interest of citizens and consumers in 
the communications market.”34  Nevertheless, it is essential to 
ensure that this primacy given to the interest of the public is 
adequately reflected in practice and that regulators do not yield 
to the pressures posed by commercial interests.35 
The references in the Act to citizens’ interests are scarce.36  
The competition-oriented approach reflected in the Draft Bill’s 
access and interoperability provisions for bottlenecks remained 
unaffected in the Act.37  The present regulatory system 
manifests a tendency toward economic as opposed to social 
regulation.38  Similarly, in the context of utility privatization, 
regulators were mainly entrusted with economic duties, and 
social concerns were of a merely secondary nature.39  Cosmo 
Graham has called for an acknowledgement of social concerns, 
in addition to the economic aims pursued by the regulators:40 
“there is no obstacle, conceptually, in thinking about access to 
utility services in terms of individual rights, in the sense of an 
entitlement as part of citizenship.”41 
                                                 
 34. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(1) (Eng.). 
 35. Regulators’ lack of enthusiasm concerning the amendments to section 
3 is illustrative of this danger.  See, e.g., Julia Day, OFCOM Boss Voices Fear 
Over Media Bill, THE GUARDIAN, July 8, 2003 (stating that, according to Lord 
Currie, “the Puttnam amendment places more emphasis on the wider cultural 
interest of the citizen, rather than the commercial interests of the consumer, 
which would ‘create long term difficulties’ for the new regulator”), available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4707983-111156,00.html. 
 36. References to citizens are included only three times in the 
Communications Act, under sections 3(1), 3(14), and 4.  See Communications 
Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 3-4 (Eng.). 
 37. For example, the wording in section 4(8) of the Communications Act, 
2003, c. 21, § 4(8) (Eng.) under the duties to fulfill Community obligations, 
remained the same as put forward by clause 4(7) of the 2002 Draft 
Communications Bill, where promotion of competition was given a much 
stronger emphasis than the need to ensure the benefit of “customers.” 
 38. See generally Paul S. Crampton & Brian A. Facey, Revisiting 
Regulation and Deregulation Through the Lens of Competition Policy; Getting 
the Balance Right, 25 WORLD COMPETITION 25 (2002) (discussing various 
theories of regulation). 
 39. See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 142. 
 40. “Over the years . . . there has been the increasing importance of 
quality of service matters which has brought along with it greater 
consideration of social matters.”  Id. at 143. 
 41. Id.; see also Goldberg et al., supra note 27, at 301 (“[The] argument for 
regulation . . . does not concern itself with the existence of limits on the 
operation of markets . . . but assumes that markets will marginalize some sort 
of programming and . . . in the long run diminish consumer choice.”).  The 
market players with the potential for affecting this “marginalization” are the 
bottleneck’s control.  This proves once again that the bottleneck challenge 
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Unfortunately, the Act fails to acknowledge the public 
policy dimension of the bottlenecks challenge.  In the context of 
utility privatization, critics decried a perception of the public as 
“simply consumers of commodities.”42  Privatization on this 
model represented “an attempt to break through old problems 
by re-conceptualizing the relationship between individuals and 
the state organs as one whereby the individual is a consumer of 
public services, rather than a citizen of a political 
community.”43  The Act’s references to the public mainly in 
terms of consumers, customers, or end users further reinforces 
the treatment of the public as economic actors as opposed to 
citizens.44 
There is a need to restore democratic regulatory 
rationales45 and to interpret the “public interest” so that it 
reflects not only economic but also social interests.46  Similar to 
the situation that Anthony Varona has identified within 
American law,47 the British framework relies on a vague notion 
of “the public interest”: 
In failing to explore adequately what might be termed in this sense 
‘the public interest’, the government has failed to establish much 
needed more solid foundations for regulatory intervention in the 
modern era . . . .  [A]n opportunity has been missed to set up a safety 
net of constitutional principle, to come into play if the balance pole 
proves insufficient in keeping the regulatory endeavor on its narrow 
and difficult traverse of the high-wire.48 
                                                 
involves more than just economic concerns. 
 42. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 87. 
 43. Id.  Graham comments further that “[c]haracterising the recipients of 
utility services as consumers does not provide a magical solution to policy 
problems.”  Id. at 88. 
 44. “[I]t may be that ‘citizen interests’ should have ranked alongside, or 
even above, ‘consumer interests’, and, as was suggested in the process of pre-
legislative scrutiny, . . . ‘effective regulation’ should be as important as 
lightness of touch.”  Feintuck, supra note 2, at 113.  In the context of the 
privatized utilities, Graham notes that “the regulators do have social 
obligations which may well pull in opposite directions from the economic 
obligations, notably the duty to promote competition . . . these social 
obligations should be seen as rights for consumers, or, more accurately, rights 
for citizens.”  GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 32. 
 45. This would require what Graham calls “going back to the 
fundamentals.”  GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 198.  He notes further that “[i]t 
may be that we have now gone as far as we can by evolutionary change and, 
instead we have to turn our attention to first principles for the first time in 
many years.”  Id. 
 46. Id. at 32. 
 47. Varona, supra note 1, at 4, 52, 56, 69. 
 48. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 108;  see also Varona, supra note 1, at 8 
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Following the pressure faced by the Draft Bill in the House 
of Lords, the public interest requirement for newspaper 
mergers has been extended to mergers in the broadcasting 
sector.49  This is seen as a counterbalance to the deregulatory 
approach in the new legal framework for electronic 
communications.50  In Lord Puttnam’s terms, the public 
interest test is seen as “a powerful player in behalf of the 
citizen.”51  The effectiveness of this test will depend on 
OFCOM’s commitment to protecting citizens’ interests.52  
Furthermore, the government will retain the final say over 
mergers.  “[T]he problem is where the ultimate decision lies . . . 
. At three separate points in the objection process, it is up to 
the secretary of state for trade and industry (whose first 
priority is not the public interest) to make a decision.”53  The 
                                                 
(“The FCC’s proceeding on new public interest duties is still open, with no new 
public interest requirements on the horizon.”). 
 49. For the public interest requirement in relation to newspaper mergers, 
see Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 375-377 (Eng.).  The extension of the 
public interest requirement to mergers in the broadcasting sector appears in 
sections 378-380.  Id. §§ 378-380 (Eng.).  The public interest amendments are 
part of the Enterprise Act, Chapter 2.  Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (Eng.);  see 
Graeme Young & Martin Myers, The Future Regulation of Media Mergers, 15 
ENT. L. R. 129, 129 (2004); Owen Gibson, Media Bill Set to Become Law 
Within a Fortnight, THE GUARDIAN, July 7, 2003, available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,47075833-10765,00.html.  The 
newspaper and the broadcasting sectors are among the few exceptions in 
which the government still has the final say in over mergers.  In the majority 
of merger cases, the 2002 Enterprise Act transferred the responsibility from 
ministers to the OFT and the Competition Commission.  See Shaun Goodman., 
Steady as She Goes: The Enterprise Act 2002 Charts a Familiar Course for UK 
Merger Control, 8 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 321, 331-46 (2003); Cosmo 
Graham, The Enterprise Act 2002 and Competition Law, 67 MOD. L. REV. 273, 
278,  280 (2004). 
 50. See generally Young & Myers, supra note 49 (discussing the impact of 
public interest requirements on media mergers). 
 51. Puttnam Statement, supra note 28, at 1433;  see also Curbing Media 
Mergers, THE GUARDIAN, July 1, 2003, available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/ 0,3858,4702541-107065,00.html 
(summarizing that “[a]ll the clause requires is that the media mergers should 
be subjected to a plurality test, defined as commitment to ‘a balanced and 
impartial presentation of news and comment.’”). 
 52. “A lot will depend on how OFCOM, which under chairman Lord 
Currie has promised to retain a ‘light touch’, chooses to interpret the public 
interest rules.”  Owen Gibson, Cross-Media Ownership, THE GUARDIAN, July 
8, 2003, available at http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4707781-
10765,00.html. 
 53. Steven Barnett, Westminster Sells Media Sown the River, THE 
GUARDIAN, July 14, 2003, available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4712245-105333,00.html. 
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secretary will decide whether OFCOM should assess the public 
interest implications of a proposed merger.54  The government 
is not bound to follow the recommendations of OFCOM or the 
Competition Commission.55  This commercially oriented 
approach for interpreting the public interest is characteristic of 
a “market-obsessed government . . . vulnerable to the pressure 
from media barons.”56 
 Unfortunately, the current framework reflects a perception 
of the public interest based on “economic rationale[s] of wealth 
maximization, to the exclusion of democratic imperatives.”57  
The law leaves citizenship-related interests vulnerable to 
commercial pressures.58  The public interest must be 
distinguished from purely economic ends, and it must include a 
range of noneconomic interests.  “[T]here has been greater 
stress on ensuring that the benefits of competition are shared 
equally and a general recognition that there are some, ill-
defined, social obligations . . . these social obligations could be 
seen as citizens’ rights.”59 
Regulation needs to be based on clear objectives, and must 
be designed to safeguard the interest of the public, perceived as 
both citizens and consumers. 60  Effective regulation demands 
“reflection on the standards and principles which govern how 
the media, and those who regulate them, operate.”61  It is more 
and more difficult to guarantee diversity, pluralism, and access 
if the public is described in impersonal terms such as 
“customers” or “end users.”  In this context, the new measures 
                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. MIKE FEINTUCK, “THE PUBLIC INTEREST” IN REGULATION 26 (2004). 
 58. Id.  In addition, in relation to privatized utilities, Graham has 
acknowledged how the 1998 Human Rights Act and the influence exercised by 
the European Union have spurred the “growing importance of citizenship 
issues.” GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 129. 
 59. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 4. 
 60. “[I]n the absence of the adoption of citizenship, or arguably some other 
clear rationale, fundamental and systematic reform of the regulatory regime, 
and therefore effective and rational regulation, will remain depressingly 
unlikely.”  Mike Feintuck, Regulating the Media Revolution: In Search of the 
Public Interest, 3 J. INFO. L. & TECH. 15, § 4 (1997), available at 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/.  Similarly, “regulation of digital 
broadcasting needs to be built on the objectives established for the analogue 
world.”  DAVID A. LEVY, EUROPE’S DIGITAL REVOLUTION, BROADCASTING 
REGULATION, THE EU AND THE NATION STATE 109 (1999). 
 61. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 108. 
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have been described as “missed opportunities for the 
government to consider from first principles what can be 
argued to be the real essence of media regulation: the task of 
defending democratic and citizenship concerns.”62 
The Act’s perception of the public as mainly comprising 
economic actors leads us to question whether there is any room 
left for citizenship rationales in the regulation of digital 
television infrastructure.  Although the Act acknowledges the 
desire to preserve pluralism and diversity in the 
communications sector, these arguments arise only in the 
context of content regulation and do not affect the regulation of 
market structure or broadcaster behavior.63  The British 
government has made it clear that although these measures 
are “highly deregulatory,” “broadcasting content will be 
protected” “at every stage of deregulation.”64  The government 
acknowledges the pluralism and diversity debate in relation to 
content, but it ignores the “public policy” implications of 
behavioral and structural regulation. 
In order to ensure citizenship access to information, the 
Act’s special provisions for public service broadcasters (PSBs)65 
concentrate mainly on the imposition of “must carry” 
obligations66 under section 64 of the Communication Act.67  
                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 3(2)(c) (Eng.). 
 64. Owen Gibson, Jowell Gets New Powers on Sky Carriage, THE 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2002, available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4550610,00.html. 
 65. See Georgina Born, & Tony Prosser, Culture and Commercialism: 
Citizenship, Public Service Broadcasting and the BBC’s Fair Trading 
Obligations, 64 MOD. L. REV. 657, 661-64 (2001) (discussing the issue of 
PSBs); Martin Cave, et. al., Regulating the BBC, 28 TELECOMM. POL’Y 249, 
262 (2004). 
 66. See Marsden, supra note 4, at 23.  “Must carry” obligations are 
justified on the grounds that “there is a fundamental public interest in certain 
channels being universally available.”  OFTEL, THE PRICING OF CONDITIONAL 
ACCESS SERVICES AND RELATED ISSUES: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT ISSUED 
BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 15 (May 8, 2002) 
[hereinafter OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/ 
broadcasting/2002/cast0502.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 67. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 64(1) (Eng.).  See OFTEL, THE 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF ENTITLEMENT, A CONSULTATION ISSUED BY THE 
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ON THE DRAFT GENERAL 
CONDITIONS OF ENTITLEMENT TO PROVIDE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 12 (May 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter OFTEL, ENTITLEMENT], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/licensing/ 
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Nevertheless, commercial pressures weakened the effectiveness 
of these provisions.  After strong lobbying from BSkyB, one of 
the United Kingdom’s largest digital television platform 
operators, the Act failed to impose “must carry” obligations on 
satellite providers.68  This concession represents a departure 
from the initial plan of applying must-carry obligations to all 
delivery platforms.69  The measure has been justified on 
grounds that the requirement of fair, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory access imposed on Conditional Access 
providers is sufficient to assist PSBs in negotiations with 
satellite platform operators.70  This mechanism may prove 
insufficient, leaving PSBs in a vulnerable bargaining position,71 
                                                 
2002/enti0502.htm. (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  “‘[M]ust carry’ obligations, or 
obligations requiring certain channels or programmes to be provided to the 
public, may be imposed on broadcasting network operators where those 
networks are the principal means for a significant number of end users to 
receive radio and television.” Id. 
 68. See Marly Didizian & Jason Romer, The Communications Bill – The 
Place of the BBC, 9 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 95, 98 (2003); Owen 
Gibson, Davies Hits out over Satellite Coverage, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 25, 2002, 
available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,847416,00.html.  Gibson 
notes that “the culture secretary, Tessa Jowell, included a clause requiring the 
BBC and other public service channels to be offered for broadcast across all 
platforms, including satellite, and removed a clause included in the draft bill 
requiring Sky to broadcast the channels.”  Id. 
 69. The White Paper refers to the carriage of Public Service television 
channels on all delivery platforms.  See DTI – DCMS, A NEW FUTURE FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS, COMMUNICATIONS WHITE PAPER 27.  A similar approach 
was adopted in the draft Bill.  Cassels, supra note 5, at 92 (“[A] policy 
statement issued with the draft Bill has indicated that the Government 
believes that BSkyB should, after switchover, be required to carry the public 
service channels at a cost.”).  Must carry obligations were addressed in clause 
49 of the draft Bill. 
 70. See Didizian & Romer, supra note 68, at 98-99.  The conditions 
applicable to the providers of Conditional Access services are contained in 
Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 45 (Eng.).   
 71. “‘Must carry’ across all platforms is an essential quid pro quo for 
imposing ‘must offer’ on PSBs.  Without it, the ability of PSBs to negotiate 
carriage on satellite at fair and reasonable terms will be severely 
undermined.”  Memorandum from Carlton Communications Plc, to House of 
Commons, Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, Minutes of 
Evidence (Feb. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Memorandum], available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmselect/cmcumeds/161/1
020808. 
htm.  “Must offer” obligations are contained in sections 272-273 of the 
Communications Act and apply to “distribution over every appropriate 
network.”  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 272 (Eng.).  Prior to the Act, 
PSBs were under no obligation to offer their services on any digital platform.  
The only obligation applied in relation to analogue terrestrial.  See OFTEL, 
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because “what was fair and reasonable in relation to 
broadcasters may not be sufficient in relation to PSBs with 
universal reach obligations and which, therefore, cannot walk 
away from negotiations if the terms offered are 
unsatisfactory.”72  Furthermore, the position of public service 
broadcasters is not aided by the fact that “fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory” access is not clearly defined in the Act. 
Access to these services proves vital in ensuring a plurality 
of market players in the communications sector.73  Access to 
bottlenecks is also instrumental in ensuring citizens’ access to 
information.  The imposition of “must carry” obligations 
constitutes merely one tool for ensuring pluralism and diversity 
in the communications sector.  Must-carry should be 
accompanied by effective regulation of bottlenecks and 
ownership.74  Unfortunately, current law fails to include a 
public policy element in regulatory measures relating to digital 
television infrastructure.75  Regulation must advance more 
                                                 
PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 15. 
 72. Didizian & Romer, supra note 68, at 99.  “[S]pecial consideration” 
should be given to “the public service nature of a channel when setting prices 
for access to the satellite.”  Memorandum, supra note 71, § 4.  In discussing 
the price that is required from PSBs for Conditional Access services, Oftel 
agreed that PSBs should pay a “commercially negotiated rate, . . . including a 
contribution towards common costs.”  OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL 
ACCESS, supra note 66, at 13.  This charge represents “both the incremental 
cost of the provision of service and a reasonable contribution to common costs.”  
OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 13.  Nevertheless, 
PSBs are charged a lesser tariff for Conditional Access services than their 
commercial counterparts.  See generally Emily Bell, BBC Breaks Free from 
Sky, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2003 (discussing the BBC’s decision to remove 
its services from the BSkyB encryption system and broadcast from the Astra 2 
satellite covering the United Kingdom), available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/mediaguardian/ story/0,7558,915403,00.html.  The 
BBC will still pay BSkyB a sum “to develop a system that will allow viewers to 
choose the correct regional version of the BBC’s TV channel.”  Owen Gibson, 
BBC and BSkyB Settle Satellite Dispute, THE GUARDIAN, June 13, 2003, 
available at 
http://media.guardian.co.uk/broadcast/story/0,7493,977149,00.html. 
 73. “Without access to technology to enable this, it would be difficult for 
broadcasters to take full advantage of digital television and radio, to the 
detriment of choice for end users and to the detriment of variety and 
innovation in the industry.”  OFCOM, STATEMENT ON CODE ON ELECTRONIC 
PROGRAMME GUIDES 4 (2004) [hereinafter OFCOM STATEMENT], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/ condocs/epg/(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).   
 74. Marsden, supra note 4, at 38. 
 75. See Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 412 (pointing towards the “existence 
of certain public policy objectives – such as the preservation of pluralism and 
consumer choice – which cannot be safeguarded solely by the application of 
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than purely economic interests.  “If [the] argument for 
regulation takes as its starting point the maximisation of 
individual consumer choice, a second argument starts from the 
need to promote a particular type of society with particular 
forms of democratic procedures.”76 
Apart from section 3, the Act refers to citizenship-related 
interests only under the “duties for the purpose of fulfilling 
Community obligations.”77  Therefore, the citizenship 
dimension is accommodated under the wider context of 
European Union law.  The law of the European Union may be 
better able to accommodate the democratic interests in the 
regulation of the technical aspects of digital television.78  The 
big media players can no longer be confined within strict 
national boundaries.  “[T]he synergistic strength of cross-media 
empires” poses a “threat to democratic values.”79 
The member states of the European Union appear 
unwilling to give away too much power in relation to the 
                                                 
competition law.”).  Interoperability and open standards need to be guaranteed 
in order to ensure that the public is not tied to a particular technology.  See 
LEVY, supra note 60, at 149.  Nevertheless, beside these concerns, it is 
necessary to ensure that the interests of the public are given primacy over 
commercial interests, and that the concept of the public is perceived as having 
both consumer and citizenship elements. 
 76. Goldberg et al., supra note 27, at 301.  Similarly, David Levy states: 
“the arguments for the pure competition-based approach appear weak.  The 
fact that broadcasting regulation is subject to political intervention simply 
reflects the political importance of this sector.  The assumption that a simple 
structural change – whereby broadcasting regulation would be transferred to a 
competition authority – would reduce the incentive for such intervention, is a 
naïve one.”  LEVY, supra note 60, at 154. 
 77. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(5) (Eng.)  In addition, according 
to Article 17 of the Treaty establishing the European Community: 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established.  Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the 
Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace 
national citizenship. 
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred by this Treaty 
and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereby. 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 17, O.J. (C 
325) 44 (2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/ 12002E_EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2005). 
 78. I assume that within the current communications sector, we must 
choose between either allowing unaccountable market players to make the 
rules of the game and supporting a supranational response within a 
democratic framework.  See Jean K. Chalaby & Glen Segell, The Broadcasting 
Media in the Age of Risk. The Advent of Digital Television, 1 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC’Y 351, 355-57 (1999). 
 79. Feintuck, supra note 2, at 122. 
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communications sector.  Given questions of competence and 
subsidiarity, it is perhaps inevitable that the Union should 
have a limited degree of influence over matters which, being 
more or less related to culture, are regarded as the proper 
concern of the member states.80  Both the 2002 Directives and 
the Act illustrate that the regulation of the digital revolution 
still has a significant national dimension.  Nevertheless, the 
Act specifies certain duties in the context of fulfilling 
community obligations, including the requirement to 
“contribute to the development of the European internal 
market.”81 
The growth of media empires beyond national borders 
poses significant challenges to national control of their power.82  
Unfortunately, it often seems that market forces shape 
regulation, rather than regulation shaping the market: “In the 
process of regulating any industry, the companies which are 
regulated will have an interest in influencing the decisions of 
the regulators and will spend a substantial amount of time and 
                                                 
 80. See id. at 111. 
 81. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 4(4) (Eng.)  Other obligations 
imposed for “fulfilling Community obligations” include the duty to “promote 
competition” in section 4(3), to safeguard the interest of European citizens in 
section 4(5), to encourage network access, and to interoperability in section 
4(7) and ensure compliance with standards in section 4(9).  Communications 
Act, 2003, c. 21, §§ 4(3), 4(5), 4(7), 4(9) (Eng.).  These duties need to be 
interpreted in accordance with article 8(2) of the Directive 2002/21/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council: 
The national regulatory authorities shall promote competition in the 
provision of electronic communications networks, electronic 
communications services and associated facilities and services by 
inter alia: (a) ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive 
maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring 
that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the 
electronic communications sector; (c) encouraging efficient investment 
in infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and (d) encouraging 
efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio 
frequencies and numbering resources. 
Framework Directive, supra note 17, at art. 8(2), 2002 O.J. (L 108) at 42. 
 82. “[T]he crucial topic of regulation is the problem of use and abuse of 
power.”  LEVY, supra note 60, at 145.  The need to control this power of the 
market is entrenched on the influential role by the media in society.  As David 
Levy states,  
[T]he true rationale of broadcasting regulation lies in the uniquely 
influential role of a medium which helps form public opinion, provides 
a forum for public debate and discussion, and - in places where 
regulation has not intervened to prevent it - offers a unique source of 
commercial and political power for private media owners.   
Id. at 144. 
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money trying to influence their decisions.”83  The power shift 
from the public sphere into private hands has increased the 
vulnerability of the public to commercial manipulation.  Only 
the European Union stands a fair chance of effectively 
controlling the power of big market players and of setting a 
framework for ensuring the protection of citizenship-related 
interests.84  Once the “public policy” dimension of the 
bottlenecks challenge is acknowledged at the European Union 
level, a similar sensitivity to democratic concerns will be 
reflected in the policies adopted at the level of the member 
states.  Unfortunately, these interests are not adequately 
reflected in the 2002 Directives or the Act.  So far, instead of 
ensuring the best deal for the public, the regulatory approach 
reveals a tendency toward guaranteeing the best deal for big 
market players.  The same words Anthony Varona used to 
describe American communications law, can be used in the 
European context to argue that “economic and marketplace 
demands” have transformed the protection of public interest 
considerations in the communications sector into a “commercial 
impossibility.”85 
II. THE BEST DEAL FOR CONSUMERS? 
This section aims to demonstrate that while the 
Communications Act failed to acknowledge the “public policy” 
dimension of regulating digital television infrastructure, it 
filled most of the gaps in the economic regulation of 
bottlenecks.  However, it remains to be questioned whether the 
economic regulation of DTV infrastructure has genuinely 
advanced the interest of consumers in mind. 
                                                 
 83. GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 87.  Similarly, Lawrence Tshuma argues, 
“[s]ome of the private sector networks raise fundamental issues regarding 
democratic accountability . . . . Without co-ordination, issues falling within the 
regulatory grey zone between networks are likely to escape effective 
regulation.”  Lawrence Tshuma, Hierarchies and Government Versus Networks 
and Governance: Competing Regulatory Paradigms in Global Economic 
Regulation, 9 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 115, 136-37 (2000).  Anthony Varona 
reaches a similar conclusion in relation to the United States: “[T]here is little 
doubt that the FCC has been ‘captured’ by the broadcast industry.”  Varona, 
supra note 1, at 82. 
 84. See generally Alison Harcourt, Engineering Europeanization: The Role 
of the European Institutions in Shaping National Media Regulation, 9 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 736 (2002) (discussing Europeanization with different policy 
instruments and intersecting agendas in the regulation of the communications 
sector). 
 85. Varona, supra note 1, at 9. 
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The regulation of digital television infrastructure suffered 
from the flawed implementation of the 1995 Advanced 
Television Standards (ATS) Directive.86  Regulation under the 
Communications Act was therefore necessary to address issues 
of access to services and networks.  “[U]nless service providers 
can get easy access through networks and gateways, and 
consumers can receive the greatest possible range of services 
through a single delivery system, there is a very real risk that 
huge possibilities offered by convergence will not be realised.”87 
Prior to recent regulatory instruments at both the 
European88 and the British level,89 critics emphasized the need 
for “a common framework for the regulation of gateways which 
control access over telecommunications networks.”90  The ATS 
Directive failed to cover interactive services offered via the Set 
Top Box (STB).91  The Directive also failed to define the terms 
“digital television services” and “broadcasters.”92 The European 
                                                 
 86. The British system for regulating CASs was based on the conditional 
access services class license, which stems from the Advanced Television 
Services Regulations, 1996 and the Advanced Television Services 
(Amendment) Regulations 1996, which in turn implemented the Advanced 
Television Standards Directive (Directive 95/47/EC as repealed by Directive 
2002/21/EC).  See OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS: OFTEL 
GUIDELINES 4 (Oct. 22, 2002) [hereinafter OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY], available 
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/broadcasting/ 
2002/cagu1002.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 87. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, at § 1B(2). 
 88. See Access Directive, supra note 17; Authorisation Directive, supra 
note 17; Framework Directive, supra note 17; Universal Service Directive, 
supra note 17. 
 89. The Communications Act 2003 received royal assent on July 17, 2003.  
Press Notice, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, The Communications 
Bill Gets Royal Assent (Jul. 7, 2003), at 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/press_notices/default.htm  (last visited Apr. 
19, 2005). 
 90. OFTEL, RESPONSE TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S WORKING 
DOCUMENT SUMMARISING THE RESULTS OF THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON 
THE GREEN PAPER ON CONVERGENCE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA 
AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SECTORS Annex A (Nov., 1998) [hereinafter 
OFTEL, RESPONSE], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/1995_98/broadcasting
/ eu1198.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  
 91. Id. 
 92. OFTEL, DIGITAL TELEVISION AND INTERACTIVE SERVICES: ENSURING 
ACCESS ON FAIR, REASONABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TERMS § 3.11 (Mar., 
1998) [hereinafter OFTEL, DIGITAL], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/ 
oftel/publications/1995_98/broadcasting/dig398.htm. (last visited Apr. 19, 
2005). 
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Union’s 2002 Directives are designed to expand the regulation 
of networks and gateways in digital television.  For example, 
the Access and Interconnection Directive adopts a “horizontal 
approach” in regulating electronic communication networks 
and services, representing “a move from the sectoral 
organization of the regulation of infrastructure.”93  The new 
measures for regulating the communications sector provide a 
coordinated response to the challenges posed by convergence.94  
These measures are designed to be technology-neutral: “[they] 
will cover all types of networks and services, hence the change 
in terminology from ‘telecommunications’ to 
‘communications.’”95  Under the current measures, providers 
are classified as “providers of electronic communications 
networks,” “electronic communications services,” and 
“associated facilities.”96  These regulations’ enhanced scope may 
lead to the regulation of previously unregulated networks and 
services, particularly in new technology areas.”97 
Initially, British law remedied this problem by adopting 
regulatory measures covering “access control services.”  Under 
this approach, Oftel98 avoided the tying of regulation to a 
particular technology by promoting “regulations based on the 
commercial process rather than on the technical definition of 
services.”99  The Act, by its adoption of measures designed to 
                                                 
 93. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411. 
 94. OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) BY INTERNET 
PROVIDERS ABOUT THE NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, Version 1:0 3 (Mar. 
24, 2003), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/is
pfaq0303.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 95. Simon Taylor, The EU Electronic Communications Package: 
Competition-Based Regulation for the Digital Age, 12 UTIL. L. REV. 83, 83 
(2002). 
 96. For a more detailed discussion see OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, supra note 94, at 3. 
 97. Taylor, supra note 95, at 83. 
 98. The duties of Oftel have been taken over by OFCOM starting 
December 29, 2003.  See 
http://www.itc.org.uk/divisions/econ_div/epg_code.asp?section (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2005). 
 99. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, Annex A.  In relation to the 
undefined notion of “television services” in the ATS Directive, Oftel states that 
these terms must not be addressed “in an unduly restrictive way.”  OFTEL, 
THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR DIGITAL TELEVISION SERVICES 
¶ A6, available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/ind_info/broadcasting/conacc.htm 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005). 
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regulate electronic communications networks, services, and 
associated facilities, illustrates the need for generic rules.100  
Therefore, the issue of access must be perceived from a cross-
sectoral perspective: “a consistent set of regulatory rules and 
principles should apply to any proprietary technological devices 
which may be used to restrict access, irrespective of the types of 
services carried via them.”101 The Act advances a “new 
framework for the regulation of electronic communication 
services and services.”102  This framework covers, inter alia, 
“TV-based digital interactive services and associated 
networks,”103 reflecting a “move towards a more horizontal 
approach” to the issue of access.104 
The ATS Directive was characterized by an overemphasis 
on the regulation of Conditional Access Systems (CASs) at the 
expense of other bottlenecks in digital television, such as 
electronic program guides (EPGs)105 and application program 
interfaces (APIs).106  Critics demanded an extension of the 
access-related conditions to include receivers.107  In its 
interpretation of the access requirements for Conditional 
Access Systems (CASs), Oftel included receivers, based on the 
view that “[t]here is clearly limited value in regulating access 
to [CASs] . . . if this is negated by control of other gateways.  
                                                 
 100. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, at § 1.3. 
 101. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411. 
 102. Communications Act, 2003, c.21, Explanatory Notes, § 5 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/en2003/2003en21.htm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2005).  The Puttnam Report notes: “[G]iven the key 
importance of access-related conditions to the future of regulation, the 
provisions of the draft Bill provide a new unified framework for such 
regulation have attracted surprisingly little comment.”  Puttnam Report, 
supra note 12, at 45. 
 103. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 88. 
 104. Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411. 
 105. These allow television viewers to search for available programs.  See, 
e.g., ETVCookbook: ETV Glossary (revised Mar. 25, 2003), at 
http://etvcookbook.org/glossary/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  
 106. API is “a set of programming tools that pre-define functions and 
routines affording convenience to developers by grouping common 
programming material into blocks.”  Id. 
 107. EPGs and APIs are classified as receivers in the DTV supply chain. 
See Martin Cave & Campbell Cowie, Not only Conditional Access. Towards a 
Better Regulatory Approach to Digital TV (Aug. 8, 2002) (on file with author).  
For a discussion of the call for extending the scope of access conditions to 
include these bottlenecks see Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 411.  Nikos 
Nikolinakos identifies the need for regulating “all existing and potential 
gateway technologies” as well as for “provid[ing] a broader framework for 
access both to networks and gateways”.  Id. 
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This has enabled the UK to take a broad interpretation of 
technical services. . . .”108  Oftel regulated EPGs “in so far as 
their provision is a provision for a Conditional Access 
Service.”109  The regulator was concerned with ensuring that 
these services reflect mainly the needs of the consumers and 
that competition is not restricted, prevented, or distorted.110  
By going beyond what was required in the ATS Directive, Oftel 
“created Europe’s most detailed regulatory framework for 
[CASs], and (together with the broadcasting regulator, the 
[ITC]) what was at that time the only set of guidelines 
anywhere in Europe on the operation of [EPGs].”111 
The approach adopted in the 2002 Directives on electronic 
communications includes APIs and EPGs “if justified,” leaving 
the member states a strong voice in such matters.112  Prior to 
the publication of the Directive, it was stated that “[i]t is too 
early in the development of digital interactive services market 
to determine whether regulatory intervention in the supply of 
APIs and EPGs is required.”113  The European Union 
emphasized that before the imposition of such requirements, it 
is necessary to encourage market players to adopt open 
standards.114 
The Communications Act refers specifically to the 
                                                 
 108. OFTEL, RESPONSE, supra note 90, Annex A. 
 109. Oftel classifies EPGs as part of CASs “in so far as [they] control[] 
access by viewers to television services.”  Commission Decision of 15 
September 1999 Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, 
1999 O.J. (L 312) 8, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexdoc!prod!CELEXnum
doc&lg=EN&numdoc=31999D0781&model=lex. 
 110. OFTEL, ITC CODE OF CONDUCT ON ELECTRONIC PROGRAMME GUIDES 
¶ 3 (1997), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/itc/itc_publications/ 
codes_guidance/electronic_programme_guide/epg_code.asp.html (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2005). 
 111. LEVY, supra note 60, at 100;  see also OVUM, STUDY ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION FOR ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACCESS 
NETWORKS AND SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
INFORMATION SOCIETY DIRECTORATE, ON THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL 
ACCESS SYSTEMS AND RELATED FACILITIES 4 fig.1.1 n.1 (2001) [hereinafter 
OVUM] (“The market for CAS may be defined to include associated facilities 
such as API and EPG, and/or to include access control systems for broadband 
interactive services.”). 
 112. OVUM, supra note 111, at 3;  see also Framework Directive, supra note 
17, at recital 18, 2002 O.J. (L. 108) at 35.  
 113. OVUM, supra note 111, at 3. 
 114. Id. 
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regulation of APIs115 and EPGs.116  EPGs are classified, 
alongside CASs, as “associated facilities.”117  Nevertheless, 
under the new measures, EPGs are regulated separately and 
not as part of the CASs, as was the approach prior to the Act.118  
In regulating receivers, OFCOM may impose obligations on the 
controllers of these technologies, in order to ensure  
(a) that persons are able to have access to such programme services 
provided in digital form, as OFCOM may determine; and (b) that the 
facility for using those interfaces or guides is provided on terms 
which- (i) are fair and reasonable; and (ii) do not involve, or tend to 
give rise to any undue discrimination against any person or 
description of persons.119 
Therefore, the Act extends the requirement of “fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” access to EPGs and APIs, going 
further than what is required in the 2002 European 
Directives.120 
                                                 
 115. The API is defined in the Communications Act 2003 as “a facility for 
allowing software to make use, in connection with any of the matters 
mentioned in subsection (4), of facilities contained in other software.”  
Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 74(3) (Eng.).  The matters discussed in 
subsection 4 include: 
(a) allowing a person to have access to programme services; (b) 
allowing a person, other than a communications provider or a person 
who makes associated facilities available, to make use of an electronic 
communications network by means of which a programme service is 
broadcast or otherwise transmitted; (c) allowing a person to become 
the end-user of a description of public electronic communications 
service. 
Id. § 74(4). 
 116. Section 74(3) of the Act defines an EPG as: 
a facility by means of which a person has access to any service which 
consists of: (a) the listing or promotion, or both the listing and the 
promotion, of some or all of the programmes included in any one or 
more programme services; and (b) a facility for obtaining access, in 
whole or in part, to the programme service or services listed or 
promoted in the guide. 
Id. § 74(3). 
 117. See id. § 32(3) (defining associated facilities).  The explanatory notes 
refer to “a facility which is available for use[,] in association with an electronic 
communications network or service[,] in order to make the provision of that 
network or service (or other services) possible, or to support the provision of 
other services.”  Id. at explanatory notes § 87. 
 118. In July 2003, Oftel noted that “EPG services are subject to their own 
conditions under the continuation notice regime and will be also when the new 
regulations are in place.”  OFTEL, THE REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS: 
SETTING REGULATORY CONDITIONS 7 (July 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/ 
publications/date_order/2003_pubs.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  
 119. Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 74(2) (Eng.). 
 120. See Framework Directive, supra note 17, at recital 30, 2002 O.J. (L 
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In July 2004, OFCOM issued a code of practice for EPG 
providers.121  This instrument is based on sections 310 and 311 
of the Communications Act122 and requires EPG operators to 
enable the use of these facilities by people with hearing or 
visual impairments and to give appropriate prominence to 
PSBs in the EPG listings.123  The Code is also concerned with 
ensuring “fair and effective competition”124 and calls for any 
agreements between EPG providers and broadcasters to be 
conducted on “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms.”125  However, critics point out that in reality, the Code 
places more emphasis on “non-discrimination” and is concerned 
to a lesser extent with ensuring “fair and reasonable” 
treatment.126  The BBC expresses disappointment that under 
the current framework, the EPG operator unilaterally decides 
the “architecture” of the EPGs.  For example, the categories 
under which channels are listed are often designed to suit “in 
house” services, while discriminating against mixed-genre 
public service channels.127  Yet, OFCOM rejected calls for 
intervening in the manner in which EPG operators exercise 
their power128 by arguing that “it would [not] be appropriate for 
O[FCOM] to prescribe what these policies should be, since this 
would constrain the approaches that EPG providers could 
                                                 
108) at 37; Access Directive, supra note 17, at recital 10, 2002 O.J. (L 108) at 
8. 
 121. See OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73.  The adoption of the Code 
was preceded by a consultation process launched in January 2004.  See Press 
Release, OFCOM, The Regulation of Electronic Programme Guides (Jan. 16, 
2004), available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media_office/news_archive/ 
nr1_20040116 (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 122. According to § 310 of the Communications Act, “[i]t shall be the duty 
of OFCOM to draw up, and from time to time to review and revise, a code 
giving guidance as to the practices to be followed in the provision of electronic 
programme guides.”  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 310(1) (Eng).  See 
discussion in Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 116-21. 
 123. See OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 6. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 8. 
 126. See BRITISH BROAD. CORP., CONSULTATION ON THE REGULATION OF 
ELECTRONIC PROGRAMME GUIDES. THE BBC RESPONSE ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter 
BBC CONSULTATION], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations/responses/epc/ responses/bbc.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 127. Id. ¶ 8. 
 128. As argued by the BBC, “without a willingness on Ofcom’s part to 
monitor how vertically-integrated EPG operators exercise their control of 
those gateways, then that control may be exercised in a manner which 
mitigates against fair and effective competition.”  Id. ¶ 11. 
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adopt.”129 
Furthermore, although the Code requires that “appropriate 
prominence” be given to public service channels, OFCOM 
refrains from providing any further guidance as to the meaning 
of these terms.  In the comments to the draft Code, the BBC 
invoked Parliament’s intent that public service broadcasters be 
given “greater prominence” in the EPG listings than their 
commercial counterparts.130  The amendments to the draft 
Code on this issue are limited to a mere request that the EPG 
operators publish a statement on how they will comply with the 
requirement for appropriate prominence.131  This provision fails 
to respond to the BBC’s concerns that “the interpretation of 
Parliament’s intent” has been left to EPG providers.132 
In relation to access provisions for CASs,133 the Act states 
that it is the duty of OFCOM to ensure that access-related 
conditions134 
(a) [a]re applied to every person who provides a conditional access 
system in relation to a protected programme service; and (b) that 
those conditions make all such provision as is required by [virtue of] 
Part I of Annex I to the Access Directive (conditions relating to access 
to digital [television and radio] services.135 
The issue of access to networks can be approached from a 
technological and a competitive perspective.  The technological 
approach refers, inter alia, to issues of access, interoperability, 
and standardization.136  On the other hand, the competition-
based approach refers to the requirement of ensuring access on 
a “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis.”137  Sections 
45138 and 73 to 76 of the Act allow OFCOM to impose access-
                                                 
 129. OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 20. 
 130. BBC CONSULTATION, supra note 126, ¶ 6. 
 131. OFCOM, STATEMENT, supra note 73, at 6. 
 132. BBC CONSULTATION, supra note 126, ¶ 6. 
 133. A CAS is defined in § 75(3) of the Communications Act as: “any 
system, facility, arrangements or technical measure under or by means of 
which access to programme services requires: (a) a subscription to the service 
or to a service that includes that service; or (b) an authorisation to view it, or 
to listen to it, on a particular occasion.”  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 
75(3) (Eng.). 
 134. See id. § 73(2) (describing access related conditions). 
 135. Id. § 75(2);  see also id. § 47(2) (referring to the tests for setting or 
modifying conditions). 
 136. Specific reference is made to the need for SMP operators to comply 
with international standards.  Id. § 75(1). 
 137. Id. § 74(2). 
 138. Under section 45, OFCOM has the power to set general conditions 
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related conditions,139 applicable especially to networks or 
associated facilities providers that control access to networks 
by other market players.140  Further conditions concerning 
network access are contained in section 87 of the Act.141  These 
conditions are necessary in order to impose a form of control on 
providers of network services, once they are no longer subjected 
to the obligations of an individual license for 
telecommunication systems: “[T]hese licence conditions will be 
replaced by a combination of general conditions applicable to 
all communications providers (or all communication providers 
of a particular type) and specific conditions to be set and 
applied to individual communications providers.”142  The 
conditions concerning Conditional Access providers may be 
applied irrespective of the degree of market power.143  This is 
                                                 
(sections 45(3), 51, 52, 57, 58 and 64), universal service conditions (sections 
45(4) and 67), access related conditions (sections 45(6) and 77), and SMP 
conditions (sections 45(7) and 87-92).  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 (Eng.).  
For an analysis of these conditions, see Nick Pimlott, Future Regulation of the 
Communications Industry Still in the Balance, 8 TOLLEY’S COMM. L. 247 
(2003).  General conditions can be imposed on anyone who provides electronic 
communications networks and services.  Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 
46(2) (Eng.).  Access-related conditions can be imposed on any person who 
“control[s] network access” or “provides an electronic communications 
network, or makes associated facilities available.”  Id. §§ 74(1), 46(6).  Access-
related conditions are not imposed solely on providers having SMP.  Pimlott 
notes that “the intended scope [of these conditions] is not clear” and that 
“seizing this uncertainty, the [Act] takes the broadest possible approach.”  
Pimlott, supra, at 247. 
 139. Based on Annex I, Access Directive implemented by section 45 of the 
Communications Act, the domestic regulator drafted major conditions on the 
issue of access, referring, inter alia, to the provision of access on fair, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.  See OFTEL, THE FUTURE 
REGULATION OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS: A CONSULTATION ISSUED BY THE 
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 14 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter 
OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION], at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/eu_directives/2003/ca
0603.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  Further conditions refer to 
“transcontrol,” obligation “to keep separate financial accounts,” and 
“publication of charges, terms and conditions.”  Id. at 14-16. 
 140. See Puttnam Report, supra note 12, at 45.  In October 2002, Oftel put 
forth the revised set of access guidelines for CA services.  See OFTEL, TERMS 
OF SUPPLY, supra note 86. 
 141. See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21 § 74 (Eng.). 
 142. See OFTEL, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 94, ¶ 1.4. 
 143. OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 10;  see also OFTEL, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) BY SERVICE PROVIDERS ABOUT THE 
NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Version 2, at 9 (Mar. 24, 2003) [hereinafter 
OFTEL, SERVICE PROVIDERS], available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/ 
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justified on the basis that “market power” is not necessarily the 
sole basis for ex ante regulation.144  Access to CASs is crucial in 
ensuring “choice to the end users” and a plurality of 
competitors in the communications market.145  Nevertheless, 
based on recital 6 of the Access Directive, national regulators 
can remove these conditions from operators that do not possess 
Significant Market Power (SMP).146 
Control of a gateway presumes a position of dominance, 
calling for market power determination and market definition 
according to European Union guidelines.  Determination of 
SMP is based on an assessment of dominance147 in the relevant 
market.148  The guidelines refer to the ability of an undertaking 
to act independently of competitors and consumers.149  The 
guidelines also consider the exercising of joint dominance150 
and the increase of power within a market due to a dominant 
position in a “closely related market.”151 
The issue of market definition poses particular concerns for 
the communications sector.152  OFCOM’s approach to market 
                                                 
eu_directives/2003/spfaq0503.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). 
 144. See OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 10 (stating that 
“competition rules alone may not be sufficient to ensure cultural diversity and 
media pluralism in the area of digital television” (citation omitted)). 
 145. See id. at 14 (explaining conditions). 
 146. See id. at 11; see also Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §§ 45(5), 73 
(Eng.); OFTEL, SERVICE PROVIDERS, supra note 143, at 9 (noting the rationale 
of recital 6 Access Directive, pointing out that “there may be large differences 
in negotiating power between providers and . . . some providers depend on 
infrastructure provided by other providers to deliver their services,” and 
calling for “proportionate access obligations on providers that control access to 
end-users”). 
 147. See OFTEL, DIGITAL, supra note 92, § 3.1 (noting that examples of 
abuse of a dominant position by bottlenecks controllers include “exploitative 
pricing for use of the gateway or behaviour leading to the distortion, 
restriction or prevention of competition in a related market”). 
 148. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 78(1) (Eng.) (“[A] person shall 
be taken to have significant market power in relation to a market if he enjoys 
a position which amounts to or is equivalent to dominance of the market.”). 
 149. See id. § 78(3); see also Case C-27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm’n, 
1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 3 C.M.L.R. 83 (1978). 
 150. See Communications Act, 2003, ch. 21, § 78(3) (Eng.) (“A person is to 
be taken to enjoy a position of dominance of a market if he is one of a number 
of persons who enjoy such a position in combination with each other.”). 
 151. See id. § 78(4); see also Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n, 
1996 E.C.R. I-5951.  
 152. See E. Jane Carter, Market Definition in the Broadcasting Sector, 24 
WORLD COMPETITION 93, 93 (2001); see also Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 
79 (Eng.) (addressing the issue of market definition). 
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definition is based on European guidelines.  The 2002 
Directives allow the European Commission to veto market 
definitions adopted by member states:  
A particularly controversial feature of the EU regime is the power 
granted to the European Commission to block NRA [national 
regulatory authority] decisions on market definition or the 
designating of operators with SMP [significant marker power], where 
these would damage the internal market or infringe Community Law.  
The [Act] should therefore be read in this context.153  
The European Union plays a prominent role in setting the 
framework to be followed within member states.  In the 
regulation of digital television gateways, all the member states 
are confronted with common problems.  The Union represents 
the most appropriate level for addressing these issues, 
illustrating the need for the supranational coordination in the 
regulation of bottlenecks. 
Under the Act, OFCOM may impose on enterprises 
possessing SMP conditions related to access to networks and 
associated facilities.154  This power affects providers of public 
electronic communication networks and controllers of 
associated facilities.155  Special consideration is given to viable 
alternatives,156 the “feasibility” of providing network access, the 
investment made by the network/facility controller,157 the long-
term effect that the imposition or the failure to impose access-
related conditions may have on competition, intellectual 
property rights,158 and the necessity of ensuring the provision 
                                                 
 153. Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 117. 
 154. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(3) (Eng.); see also Mike 
Feintuck, The UK Broadcasting Act 1996: A Holding Operation?, 3 EUROPEAN 
PUB. L. 201, 212 (1997) (arguing that the 1996 Broadcasting Act “fail[ed], 
significantly, to integrate fully consideration of control of gateways into the 
general control of cross-media holdings”). 
 155. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(2) (Eng.). 
 156. See Case C-7/79, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, 4 
C.M.L.R. 112 (1999). 
 157. See Nikolinakos, supra note 7, at 410 (expressing the concern that the 
TV Standards Directive may discourage innovation); see also OFFICE OF FAIR 
TRADING, E-COMMERCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION POLICY 2 
(Aug. 2000) (noting that network effects “occur where a system becomes more 
useful to its participants, the more participants it has”), available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/nr/rdonlyres/c58cf2cf-8e9d-496a-b989-
8ff1be9de863/0/oft308.pdf; Neil Gandal, Compatibility, Standardization, and 
Network Effects: Some Policy Implications, 18 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 80, 
80 (2002) (discussing network effects). 
 158. See Frank Wooldridge, The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Magill II: 
the Decision of the ECJ in Oscar Bronner, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 256, 261 (1999) 
(discussing the decision in Magill II regarding the essential facilities doctrine 
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of electronic communications services.159  This latter point may 
be related to the “public policy” implications of bottlenecks 
regulation and the need to ensure pluralism and diversity in 
the communications sector.  The Act reforms the definition of 
SMP, adopting an interpretation based on the competitive 
concept of dominance:160 
SMP conditions will be imposed on communications providers that 
make available associated facilities, where they are found to have a 
dominant position on the market.  These conditions will include 
access to dominant networks, controls on pricing or charges for such 
access, provision of carrier pre-select facilities, retail price controls, 
and provision of leased lines.161 
Commentators have identified the “tension” that may be 
triggered by the adoption of the same SMP test for both 
regulation and competition issues, as “the latter is dynamic and 
evolves, whereas the former is designed to establish more 
predictable rule framework on which investment decisions may 
be based.”162  Instead of creating flexibility, the new measures 
will lead to uncertainty.163 
Regarding the imposition of competition-related conditions, 
the 1995 ATS Directive required the imposition of access on a 
“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory basis,” without 
defining these terms:164 “the task of defining ‘fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory’ has provided to be an arduous one, 
especially in a context in which conditional access services are 
employed not only for a variety of entertainment services but 
                                                 
and copyright law). 
 159. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 87(4) (Eng.) (listing the factors 
OFCOM must take into account when determining what conditions should be 
set in a particular case). 
 160. Taylor, supra note 95, at 89 (“The introduction of a significant market 
power threshold based on the competition law concept of dominance will also 
avoid the inconsistency between EC competition law and regulation, which is 
a feature of the current rules.”). 
 161. Crane & Calleja, supra note 19, at 117;  see generally OFTEL, PRICING 
OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66 (containing consultations on the issue 
of price control); OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 3. 
 162. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 87. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See OFTEL, PRICING OF CONDITIONAL ACCESS, supra note 66, at 9 
(giving Oftel’s interpretation of these terms); see also Press Release, Oftel, 
Oftel Confirms Conditional Access Policy: Oftel Publishes Decision on ITV 
Complaint (Oct. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/press/releases/2002/ pr61_02.htm 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2005).  
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also in the provision of interactive services.”165 
The Act’s requirement for providing access on a fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory basis reflects the same 
wording and the same ambiguity as the 2002 Directives.166  
Within the United Kingdom, reliance has been placed on Oftel’s 
guidelines for defining these standards.  The fair and 
reasonable requirement has been interpreted as referring to 
the avoidance of “unreasonable charges.”167  Oftel assesses 
whether access is conferred on terms that are “consistent” with 
what would be reasonably expected in a competitive market.168  
Concerning the “non-discriminatory” requirement, Oftel 
addresses, inter alia, whether the conditions for granting access 
would lead to a “material adverse effect on competition.”169  
These conditions have particular relevance for the regulation of 
vertically integrated operators.170  Nevertheless, Oftel observes 
that the requirement for “non-discriminatory access” should not 
be interpreted as meaning “no differentiation at all.”171  
Differences in the provision of Conditional Access services are 
acceptable, as long as they are “objectively justifiable, for 
example, by differences in the underlying costs of supplying 
services to different undertakings.”172 
The guidelines will generally be followed by the Director 
General of Telecommunications.  Nevertheless, “the Director 
General cannot legally fetter his discretion in advance, and 
therefore he retains the ability to depart from the guidelines 
where the circumstances warrant it.” 173  As a result, these 
                                                 
 165. Cave & Cowie, supra note 107. 
 166. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, §§ 74(2), 87(5)(a) (Eng.); see also 
id. § 87(6)(a) (referring to nondiscrimination in the provision of access to 
networks and facilities); id. § 87(6)(b)-(e) (referring to the transparency 
requirement that facility controllers must honor in setting the terms and 
conditions for access to networks and facilities). 
 167. Cave & Cowie, supra note 107. 
 168. See OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 7. 
 169. Id. at 3 (stating that “comparable prices should be offered to 
comparable users, for comparable services, at comparable terms”). 
 170. See id. at 8 (“[A]n important aim of a non-discriminatory condition is 
to ensure that a vertically integrated supplier does not treat itself in way that 
benefits itself . . . in such a way as to have a material effect on competition.”); 
see also id. at 6 (asserting that in assessing pricing matters, Oftel intervenes 
only if the negotiation between undertakings fails to reach a “fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory” result). 
 171. OFTEL, FUTURE REGULATION, supra note 139, at 16. 
 172. Id. 
 173. OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 5;  see also KENNETH 
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provisions do not have binding force: “These guidelines 
represent Oftel’s current view on the way it would interpret its 
responsibilities and exercise its discretion under current 
legislation.  They do not form part of the current statutory 
provisions and so do not affect the scope of the legislation.”174  
The failure of the European Union to define what constitutes 
“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” access has passed 
this task on to the member states.  Individual states have made 
divergent interpretations of these provisions, moving further 
away from harmonization in the approach for regulating 
bottlenecks controllers.  In the United Kingdom, more certainty 
would have been provided by an explicit definition in the Act 
regarding standards for the provision of “fair, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory access.” 
Prior to the 2002 regulatory measures, one significant 
criticism of the United Kingdom’s regulatory approach to 
bottlenecks was the lack of adequate measures to address the 
issue of interoperability.  For example, the BBC noted that the 
Advanced Television Standards Directive should be updated to 
include “interoperability between [CASs], including the API 
and the EPG, . . . either through use of common and open 
standards, or that where proprietary standards are used, key 
standards and interfaces are declared and publicly available on 
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.”175 
Effective access to networks can be guaranteed only by 
ensuring open standards or interoperability176 between 
proprietary technology, as the telecommunications market has 
demonstrated.177  Open access provisions refer to the 
                                                 
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 26 (University 
of Illinois Press, 1971) (noting that administrative discretion must be confined, 
structured, and checked). 
 174. OFTEL, TERMS OF SUPPLY, supra note 86, at 5. 
 175. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, at §§ 1B(3), (4).  The research deals 
with interoperability between technical specifications in order to avoid 
bottlenecks. 
 176. See Communications Act, 2003, c.21, § 151 (Eng.) (defining “service 
interoperability” as “interoperability between different electronic 
communications services”). 
 177. See BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(A)1 (“The successful 
development of a comparative market . . . has developed on a distribution 
spine on all users, published standards, [and] an interconnect regime.”); see 
also Taylor, supra note 95, at 87.  
In order for an interactive service provider . . . to ensure that its 
content is displayed and accessed on the TV in the manner intended 
(and selected by the user via the EPG (Electronic Programme 
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requirement of “[making] facilities and/or services available to 
another undertaking, on regulated terms, for the purpose of 
providing communications services.”178  The 2002 Oftel 
guidelines on open access impose, inter alia, obligations on 
undertakings possessing significant market power “to offer 
access to their encryption systems to third-party broadcasters, 
thereby allowing those broadcasters to supply their TV 
channels to consumers.”179  Similarly, the issue of 
interoperability proves essential to avoiding establishing 
bottlenecks in the DTV supply chain: 
The lack of interoperable and open standards for 
components/software in the set top box creates gateway issues.  
Without interoperability between platforms, once a consumer has 
bought the hardware required to receive digital television, they are 
tied into that particular platform, facing a considerable capital outlay 
to switch to an alternative.180 
Competing CASs and receivers maintain the existence of 
bottlenecks in the DTV supply chain:181 “This could make it 
costly . . . for interactive retailers on one platform to replicate 
their home shopping service on another because they would 
need to rewrite their own APIs to match those of the second 
platform.”182  The 2002 Directives and the Communications Act 
encourage the adoption of voluntary standards by the 
                                                 
Guide)[)], its own API must be compatible with the API built in the 
middleware (operating system) and hardware (set top box) used by 
the interactive services platform). 
Id. 
 178. OFTEL, OPEN ACCESS: DELIVERING EFFECTIVE COMPETITION IN 
COMMUNICATION MARKETS 2 (Apr. 2001), available at 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/ 
static/archive/oftel/publications/broadcasting/index.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 
2005). 
 179. Id. at 2; see also OFTEL, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 67, at 7. 
 180. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(B)(1). 
 181. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 88 (“[B]arriers to competition could still 
arise in member states (such as the United Kingdom), where competing digital 
platforms use different conditional access systems and various API 
standards.”); see also Feintuck, supra note 154, at 206.  The preference for 
standards developed by the industry was also manifested in relation to the 
1996 Broadcasting Act.  Feintuck notes that: 
Conspicuous by their absence from the primary legislation on 
broadcasting are detailed measures concerning . . . the control of 
conditional access systems (CASs) or receiver decoding equipment.  
This, states Gibbons, reflects the Government’s wish not to intervene 
in market activity which will itself, in time, result in the emergence of 
an industry standard). 
Id. 
 182. Taylor, supra note 95, at 88. 
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industry.183  Furthermore, the 2004 review conducted by the 
Commission concluded that for the time being, there is no 
compelling need for mandatory standards.184  This preference 
for the voluntary adoption of standards is based on the view 
that “[to] ‘encourage’ rather than ‘mandate’ the open API, 
provide[s] for appropriate remuneration to be paid for the 
information required to ensure interoperability with 
proprietary APIs.”185  Nevertheless, this approach is unlikely to 
succeed, as vertically integrated players have an interest in the 
maintenance of proprietary standards.186 “[U]nder these 
circumstances, requirements for open access cannot sensibly be 
left to self regulation.  Instead, regulation is required to 
establish open access principles in advance of the development 
of services or technology.”187  In maintaining proprietary 
standards, bottlenecks controllers ensure, among other things, 
that consumers are tied to their services.  As market players 
have “too much at stake” in the preservation of these 
proprietary standards, regulators will likely have to resort to 
the imposition of standards.188  Such an approach would be 
justified on the basis of safeguarding interoperability and 
freedom of choice189 and would acknowledge that besides the 
economic dimension, issues of standardization and 
interoperability also implicate public policy favoring plurality 
and diversity.  Until then, however, Anthony Varona’s 
                                                 
 183. See OFTEL, ENTITLEMENT, supra note 67, at 7 (noting that the issue of 
standardization is addressed in Art. 17, Framework Directive and conditions 3 
and 18, Annex A, Authorisation Directive); see also Communications Act, 
2003, c.21, §§ 4(9), 4(10), 51(1)(g) (Eng.) (discussing standards); Taylor, supra 
note 95, at 87 (noting that “[a]nother agreed change to the Framework 
Directive is designed to promote the free flow of information, cultural diversity 
and media pluralism by encouraging the adoption of an open [API]” and 
characterizing an open API as “conform[ing] to a standard or specification 
adopted by the European standards organisations”). 
 184. See Communication from the European Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on Interoperability of Digital Interactive Television 
Services, SEC (2002) 1028 (July 30, 2004) (recommending further review in 
2005).  
 185. Taylor, supra note 95, at 88. 
 186. See Gandal, supra note 157, at 84. 
 187. BBC’S RESPONSE, supra note 28, § 1(A)3. 
 188. See id.; LEVY, supra note 60, at 64 (arguing that “the very existence of 
such proprietary systems increases the risk that their operators might abuse 
their positions as gatekeepers”). 
 189. See Taylor, supra note 95 at 88. 
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assessment of a regulatory framework in which the market 
players make the rules of the game will continue to apply to the 
United Kingdom: “[I]t is not surprising that the broadcast lobby 
has become one of the most obvious ‘textbook’ examples of an 
industry ‘capturing’ its regulators.”190 
CONCLUSION: “HISTORY IS WRITTEN BY THE 
WINNERS”191 
Communications markets are not in fact shaped by 
regulation.  Rather, regulation seems to be shaped by 
commercial interests at the expense of the public.  The 
Communications Act remedied only technical flaws in the 
traditional system for regulating bottlenecks in digital 
television.  Fundamental problems such as a lack of efficient 
protection for citizens and consumers in the regulation of 
digital television infrastructure are still present.  An adequate 
regulatory response requires an acknowledgment of the “public 
policy” implications of bottlenecks.  The problem of bottlenecks 
implicates a broad range of noneconomic interests including the 
public’s definition not just as consumers but also as citizens. 
We are witnessing a gradual transformation of the public 
from active citizens into passive consumers.  Anthony Varona 
has said in the United States, “[i]nertia, not democratic 
participation, is what modern commercial television seems to 
best promote.”192  Professor Varona identifies a 
communications sector in which the interest of advertisers 
takes precedence over public-related concerns.  Rather than 
balancing the interest of the public with commercial interests, 
the Act’s solution is to prioritize the interest of the public, by 
placing on OFCOM the “primary duty” of safeguarding 
citizenship and consumer interests.  Whether such a solution 
could be adapted in the United States is likely to trigger an 
endless debate.193  What is certain, however, is that such an 
                                                 
 190. Varona, supra note 1, at 115. 
 191. Remark attributed to Alex Haley, Creative Quotations: Quotations for 
Creative Thinking, available at 
http://www.creativequotations.com/one/1422a.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).  
 192. Varona, supra note 1, at 65. 
 193. See id. at 52-54.  Varona states: 
Although the FCC’s seven decades-old struggle to define the public 
interest standard can be attributed in part to the shifts in political 
winds and regulatory philosophies, as well as the vagueness of its 
legislative origins, the fundamental cause of the FCC’s difficulty and 
the doctrine’s failure is its inherent tension with the First 
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approach will only work if it permeates the entire DTV supply 
chain, rather than being limited to the consumer end. 
Democratic regulatory rationales address not only content 
but also structural and behavioral regulation.  Unfortunately, 
the Act considers pluralism and diversity implications only in 
relation to content.  It does not give enough emphasis to the 
public policy implications of the bottlenecks challenge.  
Furthermore, the Act reveals a tendency toward economic 
regulation, as opposed to social regulation.  It is therefore 
necessary to return to democratic regulatory rationales and to 
interpret the “public interest” along these lines.  Furthermore, 
regulation needs to be based on clear objectives in order to 
protect adequately the interests of citizens and consumers. 
Although the Act does refer to the primary duty of the 
regulator to safeguard the interests of citizens and consumers, 
the Act generally favors a departure from active regulatory 
intervention, towards the application of competition law.  A 
competition-based approach to the regulation of bottlenecks is 
concerned with balancing the interest of consumers with 
commercial interests, and the public is viewed exclusively as 
economic actors.  Furthermore, ex post measures may come too 
late to affect already well-established market players.  In this 
context, the analogy of “chasing the receding bus” can be 
applied with full force.194 
More effective protection of the public’s interest rests in 
active regulatory intervention, which reflects the “public policy” 
concerns associated with the bottlenecks challenge.  In relation 
to access and interoperability issues, the Act generally refers to 
the public by using impersonal terms such as “consumers,” 
“customers” or “end users.”  In an era of rapid technological 
advances in which the regulatory realm has become dominated 
by market-related interests, it is legitimate to ask: when did we 
stop being citizens? 
                                                 
Amendment . . . .  At its essence then, this tension is one between two 
conflicting interpretations of the First Amendment.  On the one hand, 
there is the perspective that the First Amendment is the notion of the 
“free marketplace of ideas” that must be protected from all 
government restriction and influence . . . .  A related but somewhat 
conflicting free speech theory is associated with James Madison . . . .   
[T]he Madisonian perspective was not principally interested in 
keeping the “marketplace of ideas” free from government interference, 
but was concerned with ensuring that all voices were present and 
heard in the marketplace. 
 194. See generally Mike Elliot, Chasing the Receding Bus: The 
Broadcasting Act of 1980, 44 MODERN L. REV. 683 (1981). 
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STATUTORY APPENDIX 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 2003, C.21 
(ENG.) 
DEFINITIONS AND OTHER GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 32(1): “In this Act ‘electronic communications network’ 
means- (a) a transmission system for the conveyance, by the 
use of electrical, magnetic or electro-magnetic energy, of signals 
of any description; and (b) such of the following as are used, by 
the person providing the system and in association with it, for 
the conveyance of the signals- (i) apparatus comprised in the 
system; (ii) apparatus used for the switching or routing of the 
signals; and (iii) software and stored data.” 
 
§ 32(2): “‘electronic communications service’ means a service 
consisting in, or having as its principal feature, the conveyance 
by means of an electronic communications network of signals, 
except in so far as it is a content service.” 
 
§ 32(3): “‘associated facility’ means a facility which- (a) is 
available for use in association with the use of an electronic 
communications network or electronic communications service 
(whether or not one provided by the person making the facility 
available); and (b) is so available for the purpose of- (i) making 
the provision of that network or service possible; (ii) making 
possible the provision of other services provided by means of 
that network or service; or (iii) supporting the provision of such 
other services.” 
 
§ 74(3): “In this section . . . ‘electronic programme guide’ means 
a facility by means of which a person has access to any service 
which consists of- (a) the listing or promotion, or both the 
listing and the promotion, of some or all of the programmes 
included in any one or more programme services; and (b) a 
facility for obtaining access, in whole or in part, to the 
programme service or services listed or promoted in the guide.” 
 
§ 74(3): “‘application programme interface’ means a facility for 
allowing software to make use, in connection with any of the 
matters mentioned in subsection (4), of facilities contained in 
other software.” 
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§ 74(4): “The matters mentioned in subsection (3) . . . are- (a) 
allowing a person to have access to programme services; (b) 
allowing a person, other than a communications provider or a 
person who makes associated facilities available, to make use of 
an electronic communications network by means of which a 
programme service is broadcast or otherwise transmitted; (c) 
allowing a person to become the end-user of a description of 
public electronic communications service.” 
 
§ 75(3): “In this section ‘conditional access system’ means any 
system, facility, arrangements or technical measure under or 
by means of which access to programme services requires- (a) a 
subscription to the service or to a service that includes that 
service; or (b) an authorisation to view it, or to listen to it, on a 
particular occasion; . . . .” 
 
§ 78(1): “For the purposes of this Chapter a person shall be 
taken to have significant market power in relation to a market 
if he enjoys a position which amounts to or is equivalent to 
dominance of the market.” 
 
§ 78(3): “A person is to be taken to enjoy a position of 
dominance of a market if he is one of a number of persons who 
enjoy such a position in combination with each other.” 
 
§ 78(4): “A person or combination of persons may also be taken 
to enjoy a position of dominance of a market by reason wholly 
or partly of his or their position in a closely related market if 
the links between the two markets allow the market power 
held in the closely related market to be used in a way that 
influences the other market so as to strengthen the position in 
the other market of that person or combination of persons.” 
FUNCTIONS OF OFCOM 
§ 3(1)(a),(b): “It shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in 
carrying out their functions- (a) to further the interests of 
citizens in relation to communications matters; and (b) to 
further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where 
appropriate by promoting competition.” 
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§ 3(2)(c): “OFCOM are required to secure in the carrying out of 
their functions . . . the availability . . . of a wide range of 
television . . . services which (taken as a whole) are both of high 
quality and calculated to appeal to a variety of tastes and 
interests.” 
 
§ 3(3)(a): “OFCOM must have regard, . . . to- . . . the principles 
under which regulatory activities should be transparent, 
accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at 
cases in which action is needed; . . . .” 
 
§ 4(3): “The first Community requirement is a requirement to 
promote competition- . . . .” 
 
§ 4(4): “The second Community requirement is a requirement 
to secure that OFCOM's activities contribute to the 
development of the European internal market.” 
 
§ 4(5): “The third Community requirement is a requirement to 
promote the interests of all persons who are citizens of the 
European Union . . . .” 
 
§ 4(7): “The fifth Community requirement is a requirement to 
encourage, to such extent as OFCOM consider appropriate for 
the purpose mentioned in subsection (8), the provision of 
network access and service interoperability.” 
 
§ 6(1)(a),(b): “Duties to review regulatory burdens . . . OFCOM 
must keep the carrying out of their functions under review with 
a view to securing that regulation by OFCOM does not involve- 
(a) the imposition of burdens which are unnecessary; or (b) the 
maintenance of burdens which have become unnecessary.” 
DUTIES TO REVIEW REGULATORY BURDENS 
§ 45(2): “A condition set by OFCOM under this section must be 
either- (a) a general condition; or (b) a condition of one of the 
following descriptions- (i) a universal service condition; (ii) an 
access-related condition; (iii) a privileged supplier condition; 
(iv) a significant market power condition (an ‘SMP condition’).” 
 
§ 47(2): “[The] [t]est for setting or modifying conditions . . .  is 
that the condition or modification is- (a) objectively justifiable 
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in relation to the networks, services, facilities, apparatus or 
directories to which it relates; (b) not such as to discriminate 
unduly against particular persons or against a particular 
description of persons; (c) proportionate to what the condition 
or modification is intended to achieve; and (d) in relation to 
what it is intended to achieve, transparent.” 
 
§ 64(1): “Must-carry obligations . . . General conditions may 
include conditions making any provision that OFCOM consider 
appropriate for securing that particular services are broadcast 
or otherwise transmitted by means of the electronic 
communications networks described in the conditions.” 
 
§ 73(2): “Access-related conditions may include conditions . . . 
for the purpose of securing- (a) efficiency on the part of 
communications providers and persons making associated 
facilities available; (b) sustainable competition between them; 
and (c) the greatest possible benefit for the end-users of public 
electronic communications services.” 
 
§ 74(2): “The conditions that may be set by virtue of section 
73(2) also include such conditions . . . necessary for securing- 
(a) that persons are able to have access to such programme 
services provided in digital form as OFCOM may determine; 
and (b) that the facility for using those interfaces or guides is 
provided on terms which- (i) are fair and reasonable; and (ii) do 
not involve, or tend to give rise to, any undue discrimination 
against any person or description of persons.” 
 
§ 75(2): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM to ensure- (a) that 
access-related conditions are applied to every person who 
provides a conditional access system in relation to a protected 
programme service; . . . .” 
 
§ 87(3): “This section authorises SMP conditions requiring the 
dominant provider to give such entitlements as OFCOM may 
from time to time direct as respects- (a) the provision of 
network access to the relevant network; (b) the use of the 
relevant network; and (c) the availability of the relevant 
facilities.” 
 
§ 87(4): “In determining what conditions authorised by 
subsection (3) to set in a particular case, OFCOM must take 
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into account, in particular, the following factors- (a) the 
technical and economic viability, . . . (b) the feasibility of the 
provision of the proposed network access; (c) the investment 
made by the person initially providing or making available the 
network . . . (d) the need to secure effective competition in the 
long term; (e) any rights to intellectual property that are 
relevant . . . and (f) the desirability of securing that electronic 
communications services are provided that are available 
throughout the member States.” 
REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
§ 310(1): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM to draw up, and from 
time to time to review and revise, a code giving guidance as to 
the practices to be followed in the provision of electronic 
programme guides.” 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE 2002 DRAFT COMMUNICATIONS 
BILL 
FUNCTIONS OF OFCOM 
cl. (3)(1)(a): “It shall be the duty of OFCOM . . . to further the 
interests of the persons who are customers for the services and 
facilities in relation to which OFCOM have functions.” 
 
cl. 3(2)(a): “In performing their duties . . . OFCOM shall have 
regard, in particular, to . . . the principles under which 
regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, 
proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in which 
action is needed; . . . .” 
 
cl. 5(1)(a),(b): “OFCOM shall keep the carrying out of their 
functions under review with a view to securing that regulation 
by OFCOM does not involve-(a) the imposition of burdens 
which are unnecessary; or (b) the maintenance of burdens 
which have become unnecessary.” 
 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/19/EC, 
2002 O.J. (L 108) [ACCESS DIRECTIVE]  
Recital 10: “Competition rules alone may not be sufficient to 
ensure cultural diversity and media pluralism in the area of 
digital television.” 
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Art. 5(1): “National regulatory authorities shall, acting in 
pursuit of the objectives set out in Article 8 of Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), encourage and where 
appropriate ensure . . . adequate access and interconnection, 
and interoperability of services, exercising their responsibility 
in a way that promotes efficiency, sustainable competition, and 
gives the maximum benefit to end-users.  In particular, without 
prejudice to measures that may be taken regarding 
undertakings with significant market power in accordance with 
Article 8, national regulatory authorities shall be able to 
impose: . . . (b) to the extent that is necessary to ensure 
accessibility for end-users to digital . . . television broadcasting 
services specified by the Member State, obligations on 
operators to provide access to the other facilities referred to in 
Annex I, Part II on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms.” 
 
Annex I; Part II: “Other facilities to which conditions may be 
applied under Article 5(1)(b): (a) Access to application program 
interfaces (APIs); (b) Access to electronic programme guides 
(EPGs).” 
 
SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC, 
2002 O.J. (L 108) [FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE] 
Recital 30: “Standardisation should remain primarily a 
market-driven process.  However there may still be situations 
where it is appropriate to require compliance with specified 
standards at Community level to ensure interoperability in the 
single market. ” 
 
Art. 8(2): “The national regulatory authorities shall promote 
competition in the provision of electronic communications 
networks, electronic communications services and associated 
facilities and services by inter alia: (a) ensuring that users, 
including disabled users, derive maximum benefit in terms of 
choice, price, and quality; (b) ensuring that there is no 
distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic 
communications sector; (c) encouraging efficient investment in 
infrastructure, and promoting innovation; and (d) encouraging 
efficient use and ensuring the effective management of radio 
frequencies and numbering resources.” 
